Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations
throughout New Jersey.
Affirmative defenses 2C:2-5. Defenses generally Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason
of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff.
Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by
the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person
(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to
engage in such conduct;
(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;
is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
c. A person
is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it;
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or
(2) His conduct is expressly
declared by law to establish his complicity.
d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if
it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision
establishing his incapacity.
e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense
committed by another person if:
(1) He is a victim of that offense;
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to
its commission; or
(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1
d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of
f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have
committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to
prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons
acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the
offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is
one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates
the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(3) The conduct
constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
b. As used in this section:
"Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
"Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;
managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly
be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the
terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due
diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular
d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual
by reason of his being an agent of the corporation.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
a. Except as
provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware
had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of
his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication
under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would
afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of
the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1,
eff. Aug. 26, 1983.
2C:2-9. Duress a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of
another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
b. The defense provided by this section is
unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also
unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the
offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.
c. It is not a defense
that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that
a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-10. Consent a. In
general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of
the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When
conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are
reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or
(3) The consent establishes a
justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the
offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute
the offense; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the
actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or
(3) It is induced
by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-11. De minimis infractions
The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute
an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:
a. Was within a customary license or tolerance,
neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
b. Did not
actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
condemnation of conviction; or
c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding
the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The
prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:2-12. Entrapment a. A public law
enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an
entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person
to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct
is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall
be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by
the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense
charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense;
civil remedies unaffected a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.
The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be
an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense
provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear.
b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of
justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear